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Implementing the AIFMD: 
Success or failure? 
Mirzha de Manuel Aramendía 
U member states have to transpose the 
alternative investment fund managers Directive 
(AIFMD) into national law by July 2013, 
marking the end to an ambitious and complex 
legislative process initiated back in 2009. The 
implementation of the Directive by the European 
Commission, in the form of a delegated Regulation
1 
issued last December, has achieved a great deal in 
remaining faithful to the Directive while making the 
regime far more workable than many in the industry 
had anticipated. 
This commentary focuses on four key aspects: the 
limits to delegation of risk and portfolio management, 
the depositary duties and liabilities, the measurement 
of leverage, and the frequent recourse to the 
proportionality principle in the delegated Regulation. It 
also considers the remuneration guidelines recently 
adopted by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA).
2 It finds that both the European 
Commission and ESMA have followed a practical and 
flexible approach to implementation, which should 
help secure the success of the framework, which is still 
today uncertain. The implementation has however 
toughened the stance on the methodology to calculate 
leverage, with limited impact for AIFs (Alternative 
Investment Funds), but potential repercussions for 
UCITS.
3 
                                                       
1  Commission delegated Regulation of 19 December 2012 
supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU with regard to 
exemptions, general operating conditions, depositaries, 
leverage, transparency and supervision [publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Union pending]. 
2 Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under the AIFMD, 
ESMA/2013/201. 
3 See the consultation on UCITS with regard to product rules, 
liquidity management, depositary, money market funds and 
The Directive in hindsight 
The AIFMD is not a hedge fund Directive, as 
frequently portrayed, but the default framework for the 
asset management industry in Europe. It also covers 
managers of private equity, infrastructure and any 
other fund type that is not a UCITS. By bringing all 
non-UCITS managers into a single framework, the 
Directive should avoid constraining innovation. Few 
but very significant restrictions are imposed by the 
Directive and these apply chiefly in four respects: i) 
delegation, to limit the circumvention of its provisions; 
ii) remuneration, to ensure it aligns with best practices 
in risk management; iii) conflicts of interest between 
prime brokers and depositaries; and so-called iv) asset 
stripping for private equity managers. The AIFMD 
does not prescribe asset allocation or maximum 
leverage, in contrast with UCITS.  
Despite this relatively benign approach, the Directive 
introduces substantial compliance and disclosure 
burdens, notably with regard to custody and valuation, 
which could ultimately hurt returns for investors (de 
Manuel & Lannoo, 2012). Arguably these burdens are 
justified to better protect professional investors and 
end beneficiaries and to equip supervisors with the 
information and tools they need to monitor flows and 
risks – in line with the lessons drawn from the 
financial crisis (Turner, 2009; de Larosière, 2009). 
Yet, whether the benefits of transparency and 
reliability will outweigh the cost is still unclear and 
will depend on the ability of intermediaries to deliver 
competitively-priced services and the preference of 
investors for AIFs versus off-shore vehicles. The 
outcome also hangs on the practical implementation of 
the Directive at EU and member state level. 
                                                                                          
long-term investments, issued by the European Commission on 
26 July 2012. 
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The importance of the AIFMD framework for the 
European economy should not be underestimated, as it 
sets the ground for asset managers to offer their 
services to professional investors freely across member 
states. By opening the single market for asset 
managers, without the product constraints of UCITS, 
the AIFMD has the potential to contribute to the 
recovery in Europe by furthering the development of 
its capital markets, increasing the diversity of funding 
sources and reducing its historical dependence on bank 
finance.  
Key notes on implementation 
In December 2012, the European Commission adopted 
a delegated Regulation implementing the AIFMD, 
with the exception of the rules regarding market access 
for non-EU funds and managers, to be implemented at 
a later stage (de Manuel, 2011).
4 The process had been 
the object of controversy given the technical 
reservations expressed by Commission about the 
advice delivered earlier by the ESMA, which explains 
the delay in its adoption.
5 The final text demonstrates 
however the importance attached to securing the 
success of the framework. The next sections will 
consider the way in which three key aspects are 
implemented: i) the limits to the delegation, ii) the 
depositary framework and iii) the measurement of 
leverage. It also considers the use of the 
proportionality principle, allowing for a targeted 
application of the Directive with regard to the different 
nature, scale and complexity of AIFs. 
1.  Workable limits to delegation, pending 
arrangements with third countries 
The AIFMD requires managers to justify their entire 
delegation structure on objective reasons.
6 It also 
limits the delegation of portfolio and risk management 
to supervised managers.
7 And it prohibits managers 
from delegating their functions to the extent that they 
cannot be considered the managers of the AIF and 
become ‘letter-box’ entities.
8 The vagueness of these 
requirements raised many concerns for the industrial 
organisation and competitiveness of the EU asset 
management industry and its ability to access local 
expertise in emerging markets. The implementing 
Regulation has, however, largely addressed these 
concerns; while it may result in the restructuring and 
                                                      
4 Commission delegated Regulation of 19 December 2012 
supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU with regard to 
exemptions, general operating conditions, depositaries, 
leverage, transparency and supervision [publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Union pending]. 
5 Technical advice to the European Commission on possible 
implementing measures of the Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers Directive, ESMA/2011/379. 
6 Art. 20 (1) (a) AIFMD. 
7 Art. 20 (1) (c) AIFMD. 
8 Art. 20 (3) AIFMD. 
in-sourcing of some activities, the regime will not limit 
delegation unduly – provided the required supervisory 
arrangements are concluded with third countries – as 
discussed below: 
-  As objective reasons, the implementing Regulation 
considers not only accessing expertise in markets, 
investments or trading capabilities but also cost 
savings and the optimisation of business 
functions.
9 The instances are so broad that one 
would have a hard time finding any reason for 
delegation that would not be permissible. 
Assessing whether delegation is aimed at 
circumventing the Directive becomes a rather 
subjective test. This probably contradicts the intent 
of the legislator but the intention in all likelihood 
was highly abstract, which is difficult to 
implement in any event. 
-  The implementing Regulation also clarifies that 
“entities authorised or registered for the purpose of 
asset management and effectively supervised” are 
considered equivalent – whether EU or foreign. 
Delegation to non-EU managers is possible as long 
as the supervisor of the home member state has 
signed a cooperation arrangement with the 
authorities in the third country. This requirement is 
of great concern given the limited progress 
achieved in negotiating these arrangements so far 
and the proximity of the deadline (July 2013). 
-  The prohibition against ‘letter-box’ entities is also 
muted by the vast array of qualitative factors that 
competent authorities should consider, including 
the investment goals, strategies and risk profile of 
the AIF, as well as the geographical and sectoral 
spread of its investments.
10 The many criteria 
under consideration are probably justified but they 
open the door for competition among fund 
domiciles for the most business-friendly approach 
to delegation. Given the risk, the European 
Commission has asked ESMA to harmonise 
supervisory practices and will review their 
application in 2015.
11  
All in all, the application of the limits to delegation 
will depend on national supervisors, which should 
facilitate the competitiveness of EU asset managers, 
while deterring abuses aimed at circumventing the 
Directive. It is now a matter for these supervisors to 
conclude the necessary arrangements with third 
countries before the entry into force of the Directive, 
under the coordination of ESMA. 
                                                      
9 Art. 78 (2) Implementing Regulation. 
10 Art. 76 (1) Implementing Regulation. 
11 Art. 82 (3) Implementing Regulation. Note also that a 
manager without sufficient resources and expertise to perform 
both the portfolio and risk management functions should be 
denied authorisation to begin with, according to Arts 6 and 18, 
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2.  Softened edges and more clarity for 
depositaries 
The AIFMD entrusts depositaries with controlling the 
legal title of assets, keeping assets in custody or 
otherwise in record, monitoring cash flows and several 
oversight functions.
12 When implementing the 
Directive, the crucial question was which assets can be 
kept in custody instead of kept in record given the 
different standard of applicable liability.
13 
 The loss of 
an asset kept in custody entails strict liability while, in 
record-keeping, liability arises only in the case of 
negligence or intentional failure.
14 The rules are tough, 
but implementation has softened the edges. 
On the scope of custody, the Commission largely 
follows the advice of ESMA: assets to be held in 
custody are transferable securities, money market 
instruments and fund units capable of being held in an 
account in the name of the depositary.
15 These are 
instruments that can be held in an account in the name 
of the depositary and over which the depositary has 
control. Listed derivatives are excluded from the 
custody duty, pending the introduction of the securities 
law Directive (SLD) and the Regulation on OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories (EMIR). Transferable securities 
embedding a derivative however are subject to the 
custody obligation. 
Less clear-cut is the situation arising from collateral 
arrangements, securities lending and repos. Under the 
implementing Regulation, assets will exit custody, 
only if there is a transfer of ownership away from the 
AIF. One therefore needs to look at each transaction. 
For collateral arrangements, the collateral Directive 
distinguishes between title-transfer and security 
arrangements: under the latter, there is no transfer of 
title so the assets remain in custody.
16 But without 
harmonised securities and bankruptcy laws, problems 
will continue to arise in practice.  
The implementing Regulation also clarifies the strict 
liability standard and conditions for exoneration. To 
avoid liability for the loss of an asset held in custody, 
the depositary would have to prove three conditions: i) 
it did not cause the event leading to the loss; ii) it 
could not have reasonably prevented the event; and iii) 
it could not have reasonably prevented the loss.
17 The 
key condition is the last one since it imposes on the 
depositary a duty of due diligence to monitor any risks 
                                                      
12 Arts. 20 (7) – (10) AIFMD. Custody involves holding a 
security, either physically or electronically while record-
keeping only concerns taking note of the given right or 
contract. See de Manuel & Lannoo (2012), pp. 81-89. 
13 Art. 20 (8) AIFMD.  
14 Art.20 (12) AIFMD.  
15 Art. 88, Implementing Regulation. 
16 Directive 2002/47/EC. 
17 Art. 101, Implementing Regulation. 
and take appropriate action. If the risk is significant, 
the depositary must inform the manager and could, 
under certain conditions, discharge its liability.
18 
Beyond custody, the Directive transforms a single 
depositary into a sort of censor or auditor of the 
manager. Even core functions, such as asset and risk 
management, could be affected by the depositary 
issuing warnings, as just mentioned. The implementing 
Regulation goes so far as to confer upon the single 
depositary the power to access books and perform on-
site visits to the manager and any service provider 
appointed by it, including administrators and valuers.
19 
Policing powers are an anecdote, but they epitomise 
the profound changes in business practices and 
contractual relationships that are about to take place. 
The implementing Regulation also details the cash 
monitoring and oversight functions.
20 
The AIFMD consolidates custody as the central 
element that differentiates asset management from 
other forms of financial intermediation. This is a 
positive development for the industry, as it protects the 
agency nature of its business. It also sets the ground 
for greater expansion of asset management in Europe 
as a vehicle to channel savings into investments, in a 
far simpler and safer fashion than traditional banking 
and insurance, given the identification and segregation 
of assets.
21 However, the complexity of the depositary 
regime in the AIFMD, despite smart implementation, 
is great (far greater than presented here). Whether the 
benefits will outweigh the costs is not clear yet and 
will depend on factors, including notably the ability of 
the depositaries to deliver efficient and competitively-
priced services in compliance with the Directive. 
3.  Further flexibility through proportionality 
Further flexibility comes from the introduction of the 
proportionality principle by the implementing 
Regulation in several provisions. The principle entails, 
for the provisions affected, that they should not 
necessarily be applied in full but in a way that is 
proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the 
AIF, and the size and organisation of the AIFM. Large 
managers of complex funds should comply in full, 
while a small manager running, e.g. an unleveraged 
fund should be spared any compliance burden that is 
                                                      
18 Art. 102, Implementing Regulation. 
19 Art. 92 (4) Implementing Regulation. 
20 Arts 87-87 and 92-97, Implementing Regulation. 
21 The argument that asset management is a simpler and safer 
form of financial intermediation than traditional banking and 
insurance is also supported by two other elements: i) the limited 
extent of maturity and liquidity transformation (as far as the 
maturity and liquidity of the underlying assets are in line with 
the redemption policies) and ii) the absence of guarantees. 
Caveats are the extensive use of derivatives and securities 
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not justified to achieve the objectives of the 
Directive.
22 
Since the AIFMD applies in principle to any non-
UCITS manager, without either defining business 
models or investment strategies or constraining 
eligible assets, the proportionality principle is of great 
consequence.
23 The implementing Regulation 
introduces this principle in 16 provisions referring to 
organisational requirements, conflicts of interest, 
securitisation positions, risk management, liquidity 
management and depositary duties. Table 1 in the 
Annex provides an overview of these provisions. 
It will fall primarily on national supervisors to monitor 
the application of the proportionality principle in 
practice, and develop guidance or supervisory 
practices that improve legal certainty for market 
participants. In principle, proportionality should apply 
only when the Commission’s implementing Regulation 
explicitly allows. The proof of the pudding will be in 
the transposition of the Directive and the development 
of supervisory practices by member states. The 
Commission and ESMA will need a watchful eye to 
protect the level playing-field within the newly created 
single market.  
4.  Neutralisation allowed for remuneration 
The AIFMD also recognises the proportionality 
principle in the application of its provisions regarding 
remuneration and mandates ESMA to develop 
guidelines taking due account of this principle.
24  
The rules on remuneration have several objectives, 
sometimes conflicting: i) promote the alignment of 
remuneration policies with the interest of investors; ii) 
mitigate risk-taking for macro-prudential purposes and 
iii) avoid the reward of failure. The investor protection 
goal has been heavily criticised by the industry which 
considers that professional investors do not need 
protection, given their expertise and contractual power. 
But the evidence from the financial crisis points rather 
towards the importance of micro-prudential risks and 
their link with financial stability (Turner, 2009; de 
Larosière, 2009).  
In the pursuit of these goals, the AIFMD goes beyond 
principled-based regulation and contains some hard 
obligations such as the attribution of at least 50% of 
variable remuneration in fund units or the deferral of at 
least 40% of variable remuneration in a period 
appropriate to the life-cycle of the AIF. The industry 
has argued that these limits are too severe and, being 
originally devised for banks, fail to take into account 
the nature of the agency business of asset managers. 
                                                      
22 Also in line with the de minimis thresholds in the Directive 
(Art. 3, AIFMD). 
23 See the explanatory addendum to the Regulation 
implementing the AIFMD (p. 4). 
24 Art. 13 and Annex II, AIFMD. 
Regulators have privileged here the uniformity of the 
rules applied across intermediaries to limit arbitrage. 
Besides compliance costs, there is genuine concern 
that the rules could have an inflationary effect on 
compensation. While the rules do not limit the total 
amount paid, policies such as deferrals may have an 
impact on the attractiveness of the EU industry as an 
employer. Management houses may need to offer 
higher total remuneration to compensate for deferrals, 
given competition from other jurisdictions where more 
lenient regimes apply.  
Nevertheless, the deferral of variable remuneration, 
coupled with the assessment of performance in a 
multi-year framework, are central to managing assets 
in accordance with the interests and investment 
horizons of clients and end beneficiaries.
25 The long-
term benefits for the business models of EU asset 
managers should largely outweigh any short-term 
drawbacks. 
Moreover, under the ESMA guidelines, proportionality 
would apply at two levels: i) among AIFMs, with 
respect to their size, internal organisation, and nature, 
scope and complexity of their activities; and ii) within 
each AIFM, with respect to the different categories of 
staff and their impact on the risk profile of the AIF.
26 
The guidelines allow for neutralisation in exceptional 
circumstances, meaning the disapplication of some of 
the provisions on remuneration in the Directive.
27  
The industry is split between its desire for legal 
certainty and flexibility, both of which cannot be 
achieved at the same time. In the interest of flexibility 
and given the wide variety of business models 
captured under the AIFMD, ESMA has not based its 
guidelines on quantitative thresholds. However, it may 
need to develop its qualitative guidance further to 
provide more certainty and foster supervisory 
convergence. 
5.  Toughened calculation of leverage 
The calculation of leverage is important in two 
respects, firstly, to determine the size of the manager 
                                                      
25 The Directive does not mandate a specific multi-year 
framework for assessing performance and deferring 
remuneration. Instead it asks the AIFM to do so in line with the 
life cycle and redemption policy of the fund. 
26 Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under the 
AIFMD, ESMA/2013/201. Against this background, the role of 
the ESMA guidelines is to facilitate a common understanding 
of the Directive by business and supervisors. The choice of 
instrument is important since guidelines are soft law, which 
does not bind managers directly but only through the action of 
national supervisors. The guidelines are of particular 
importance to determine how the proportionality principle will 
apply in practice to remuneration policies.   
27 Paragraphs 25-27, ESMA guidelines. It is interesting to note 
that the draft guidelines did not explicitly allow for 
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and whether it needs to comply at all with the 
Directive, and secondly, to establish whether it runs 
leverage on a substantial basis and is subject to 
additional reporting obligations.
28  Contrary to the 
trend elsewhere, the implementing Regulation follows 
here a stricter approach than anticipated. 
EU legislation has traditionally recognised value at 
risk (VaR)
29 as a tool to measure not only risk but also 
leverage, as in the advanced method to calculate global 
exposure under the UCITS Directive.
30 Despite the 
advice of ESMA, the European Commission has 
completely discarded the use of VaR to measure 
leverage under the AIFMD. In effect, VaR does not 
measure leverage but only provides an estimation of 
the maximum potential loss in the value of a portfolio, 
based on historical data and assumptions such as 
normally distributed returns. As the European 
Commission points out, certain investment strategies 
have low VaR but high leverage.
31 
Instead, managers will have to calculate both gross and 
net leverage following the commitment approach 
devised by ESMA for UCITS in 2010.
32 This 
methodology consists of calculating the sum of the 
absolute value of all positions and then deducting 
netting and hedging arrangements. Managers will be 
constrained by this approach since the proposal of 
ESMA to allow internal models was also discarded by 
the Commission, amidst growing distrust on the use of 
internal models for regulatory purposes.  
In sum, the use of VaR for regulatory purposes has 
been badly discredited as a proxy for leverage as a 
result of the implementation of the AIFMD, with 
potential repercussions for UCITS. The debate on how 
best to distinguish exposure, risk and leverage will 
continue in 2013, following the UCITS consultation 
launched last year.
33 If the implementation of the 
                                                      
28 Arts 3 (2) and 24 (4) AIFMD, respectively. 
29 Value at risk (VaR) provides an estimation of the potential 
decrease in value of a given portfolio based on the past 
performance of its components. For instance, a VaR (20 days, 
99%) of €5 million means that under normal market 
circumstances, there is a 99% probability that the fund’s 
portfolio will not lose more than €5 million in value in 20 
trading days.  
30 The use of value at risk (VaR) to measure global exposure is 
enabled by Art. 41 (3) of Directive 2010/43/EU, implementing 
UCITS IV, and developed by ESMA guidelines (CESR/10-
788). The VaR limit set in the guidelines effectively substitutes 
the 100% NAV limit set by Art. 51 (3) of the UCITS IV 
Directive (2009/65/EC). For a discussion in this respect, see de 
Manuel & Lannoo (2012), pp. 66-76. 
31 Impact assessment, accompanying the implementing 
Regulation, SWD (2012) 386 final, p. 29. 
32 ESMA guidelines (CESR/10-788) on risk measurement and 
the calculation of global exposure and counterparty risk for 
UCITS. 
33 Consultation on product rules, liquidity management, 
depositary, money market funds and long-term investments, 
European Commission, 26 July 2012. 
AIFMD is to serve as reference for UCITS, it is likely 
that the commitment approach will end up being 
applied on a cumulative basis, rather than as an 
alternative to VaR, to better enforce the 100% NAV 
limit set by the Directive for the exposure acquired 
through derivatives.
34  
Conclusion 
Not surprisingly, given the length and complexity of 
the Directive, its implementation is similarly long and 
detailed. However, the European Commission has 
achieved a great deal in remaining faithful to the text 
while making the regime far more workable than many 
in the industry had anticipated. The limits to delegation 
have been made much more flexible and the depositary 
rules much clearer. The proportionality principle 
introduced in several provisions should allow for their 
targeted application to the many different categories of 
AIFs. Greater flexibility will however demand greater 
supervisory efforts and, in order to ensure 
convergence, ESMA will need to play a central role.  
The AIFMD creates an internal market for asset 
management and is an important piece of legislation 
for the European economy. Its success should foster 
the development of capital markets and help reduce the 
historical dependence of the European economy on 
bank finance. It is too early, however, to proclaim 
success, which will depend on many factors, including 
the ability of managers to attract the interest of 
investors worldwide for AIFs. The safeguards built 
into the Directive have a price tag but if UCITS is to 
serve as a reference, also professional investors may be 
willing to buy. By July 2013, member states should 
have transposed the Directive into national legislation. 
As the legislative process draws to a close, the time 
comes for the industry to move forward. EU and 
national authorities would be well advised to commit 
to the success of the framework, to the extent that the 
European economy needs more market-based finance. 
 
                                                      
34 Art. 51 (3) UCITS IV, see note 30. 6 | Mirzha de Manuel Aramendía 
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Annex 
Table 1. The proportionality principle in the implementation of the AIFMD* 
Articles in the implementing Regulation  Remarks (limited scope, 
neutralisation) 
Corresponding articles 
AIFMD 
22  Operating conditions – Resources   12   
31  Conflicts of interest policy   
14   
33  Procedures and measures preventing or managing 
conflicts of interest 
Independence of persons engaged in 
activities affected 
39  Permanent risk management function  Frequency of reporting    
15  Explicitly allows 
neutralisation of the 
functional and 
hierarchical separation of 
the risk management 
function by national 
authorities 
40 Risk  management  policy   
41  Assessment, monitoring and review of the risk 
management systems  Frequency of reviews 
43  Safeguards against conflicts of interest  Review of risk management function 
45  Risk measurement and management   
48  Liquidity management limits and stress tests 
Liquidity management limits  
Explicitly allows neutralisation 
16  Does not apply to close-
ended unleveraged AIFs 
53  Qualitative requirements concerning AIFMs 
exposed to securitisations 
Stress tests where proportional to the 
risks in the securitisation positions  17   
57  General organisational requirements   
18    61  Permanent compliance function  Scope and independence of function 
62  Permanent internal audit function  Explicitly allows neutralisation 
92  Depositary: Oversight duties – general 
requirements   
21   95  Depositary: Duties regarding the carrying out of 
the AIFM’s instructions   
101  Depositaries: Liability discharge  Due diligence requirements 
* Reference is made in the table to the articles where the implementing Regulation allows for certain flexibility so that its rules can be 
applied in a proportionate way, where justified by the size and the organisation of the AIFM and the nature, scale and complexity of the 
managed AIF. Neutralisation refers to the permissibility of displaying a given provision in full based on the proportionality principle. 
Source: Author’s own elaboration. 